Earnings management occurs when management uses the flexibility inherent in accounting standards
to manage the firm’s reported accounting earnings to influence some economic outcome to the firm’s (or
management’s) benefit (Schipper, 1989). This paper examines earnings management in European Union (EU)
firms initiating anti-dumping trade investigations. Anti-dumping investigations in the EU (and elsewhere)
involve two key determinations. First, the prices at which foreign exporters are selling goods in the EU are
compared to the goods’ normal values to determine if goods are being dumped into the EU.1 Second, the
financial performance of the allegedly affected domestic EU industry is examined to determine if the domestic
industry has suffered financial injury as a result of the dumping. When both dumping and material injury are
present, duties on the goods imported into the EU are assessed. These duties make the products of the domestic
industry more competitive and financially benefit the domestic industry. This setting provides clear incentives
for the domestic industry to engage in earnings management to enhance the likelihood of an affirmative injury
decision, and, in some cases as we explain later, to increase the tariffs assessed against competing imports.