The specific contribution of self-projection in time and self-relevance over and above the role of scene construction in EFT
is currently rather speculative. For instance, does mentally projecting an imaginary event into the future make it any different
from imagining an event not temporal in nature (e.g., ‘‘Imagine walking in a sunny garden next year’’ vs. ‘‘Imagine walking
in a sunny garden’’)? Similarly, is there any difference between imagining oneself doing an activity and imagining
familiar others doing the same activity (e.g., ‘‘Imagine walking on the beach next year’’ vs. ‘‘Imagine Silvio Berlusconi walking
on the beach next year’’)? So far, only a few studies have provided initial insights into this issue. With respect to the role of
the temporality of imagined events in EFT, Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, and Maguire (2007) reported that five memory-impaired
patients with a bilateral hippocampus damage had difficulty in constructing novel events. Their imagined experiences
were deficient in spatial coherence, relative to controls, resulting in their constructions being fragmented and lacking in richness