The role of Israel and the Palestinians in
intra-Arab relations
Apart from the influence of Arabism on intra-Arab relations, another specific
and unusual influence has been that of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. As far as
the particular role of Israel was concerned, this stemmed largely from the fact
that, for the first thirty years of its existence, its relations with its Arab neighbours
were conducted almost exclusively by force and by threat of force, a policy
developed by its long-time prime minister David Ben-Gurion and his defence
establishment in the early 1950s. At different times this was aimed at preempting
an Arab attack, at preventing Arab support for Palestinian and other
guerrillas, and at trying to get rid of a hostile Arab leader like President Nasser.32
Israel’s Arab neighbours, for their part, were unwilling either to sign a peace
treaty or to normalize relations and were thus left with the choice of preparing
for war or seeking some kind of unofficial modus vivendi. As a rule, Egypt and
Syria took the former path, and Jordan and Lebanon the latter.
This unresolved conflict was largely responsible for a Middle Eastern arms race,
a series of wars, and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and Egypt’s
Sinai peninsula in 1967, as well as numerous lesser clashes. The Palestinian factor
added an extra dimension, particularly after the increase in the size and bellicosity
of the guerrilla organizations in the late 1960s. The consequence was to bring
Lebanon and Jordan more directly into the conflict as a result of Israeli raids
against the bases established on their territory. However, Israel’s policy towards the
two states soon diverged. No sooner had King Hussein decided to expel the guerrillas
from Jordan than Israel reverted to its traditional policy of support for the
Hashemite monarchy as a conservative force on its eastern flank. At the same time,
intervention against the Palestinians in Lebanon became ever more intense,
leading up to the Israeli invasion of the country in 1982, the military defeat of the
Palestinians and the brief attempt to engineer the establishment of a friendly
regime dominated by the Lebanese forces and controlled by the newly elected
president, Bashir Gemayel. Even though politically unsuccessful, Israel’s invasion
triggered off a series of changes in the internal balance of power between
Christian, Shi’i and Druze militias that were to make their own major contribution
to the further disintegration of Lebanon’s fragile social system.
One reason why the Israelis were able to exercise their power in Lebanon was
the fact that the Egyptians had already signed a peace treaty with them in 1979.
From President Sadat’s point of view this involved a considered decision to
normalize relations with his powerful neighbour. It also involved the implicit decoupling
of the political equation that implied that support for the Palestinians
and hostility to Israel were two sides of the same coin. For most of the other Arab regimes, however, this was seen as a gross betrayal of the Arab cause, even if the
majority of them soon began, cautiously, to follow the Egyptians along the same
path.
النتائج (
العربية) 1:
[نسخ]نسخ!
The role of Israel and the Palestinians inintra-Arab relationsApart from the influence of Arabism on intra-Arab relations, another specificand unusual influence has been that of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. As far asthe particular role of Israel was concerned, this stemmed largely from the factthat, for the first thirty years of its existence, its relations with its Arab neighbourswere conducted almost exclusively by force and by threat of force, a policydeveloped by its long-time prime minister David Ben-Gurion and his defenceestablishment in the early 1950s. At different times this was aimed at preemptingan Arab attack, at preventing Arab support for Palestinian and otherguerrillas, and at trying to get rid of a hostile Arab leader like President Nasser.32Israel’s Arab neighbours, for their part, were unwilling either to sign a peacetreaty or to normalize relations and were thus left with the choice of preparingfor war or seeking some kind of unofficial modus vivendi. As a rule, Egypt andSyria took the former path, and Jordan and Lebanon the latter.This unresolved conflict was largely responsible for a Middle Eastern arms race,a series of wars, and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and Egypt’sSinai peninsula in 1967, as well as numerous lesser clashes. The Palestinian factoradded an extra dimension, particularly after the increase in the size and bellicosityمنظمات حرب العصابات في أواخر الستينات. وكانت النتيجة تجلبلبنان والأردن أكثر مباشرة في النزاع نتيجة للغارات الإسرائيليةضد قواعد المنشأ على أراضيها. ومع ذلك، سياسة إسرائيل تجاهوتباينت الدولتين قريبا. لم تكد قرر العاهل الأردني الملك حسين بطرد المسلحينمن الأردن من إسرائيل عادت إلى سياستها التقليدية لتقديم الدعمالملكية الهاشمية كقوة محافظة على أن الجناح الشرقي. في الوقت نفسه،التدخل ضد الفلسطينيين في لبنان أصبح أقوى من أي وقت مضى،رائد حتى الاجتياح الإسرائيلي للبلاد في عام 1982، هزيمة عسكريةالفلسطينيين ومحاولة مختصرة لمهندس إقامة مباراة وديةنظام تسيطر عليه القوات اللبنانية ويسيطر المنتخب حديثاالرئيس بشير الجميل. حتى وأن كان سياسيا ناجحاً، الغزو الإسرائيليفجرت سلسلة من التغيرات في توازن القوى الداخلية بينالمسيحية، المليشيات الشيعية والدرزية التي كانت لجعل الخاصة بهم الرئيسية المساهمةإلى زيادة تفكك النظام الاجتماعي الهش في لبنان.وكان أحد الأسباب لماذا الإسرائيليين كانت قادرة على ممارسة سلطتها في لبنانوحقيقة أن المصريين قد وقعت فعلا معاهدة سلام معها في عام 1979.من وجهة نظر الرئيس السادات انطوى قرار مدروستطبيع العلاقات مع جاره قوية. وشملت أيضا فصل ضمنيفي المعادلة السياسية وهذا يعني أن الدعم للفلسطينيينوالعداء لإسرائيل هما وجهان لنفس العملة. بالنسبة لمعظم الأنظمة العربية الأخرى، ومع ذلك، اعتبر هذا خيانة جسيمة للقضية العربية، حتى لوالأغلبية منهم سرعان ما بدأت، بحذر، لمتابعة المصريين على طول نفسالمسار.
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