67. That being so, we must take Jones's case as we find it. On no basis does it support Mr Snow¬den’s proposition. Russell J was certainly piercing the veil so as to identify Mr Lipman with his creature company, Alamed, which he had used with the intention of defeating the plaintiffs’ rights: Mr Lip¬man was advancing Alamed as an unrelated legal person that was in no manner bound by the con¬tract. The case was not, however, decided on the basis that, once the truth was uncovered, Alamed was revealed as an original contracting party. It plainly was not, such a notion would have been absurd and the emphasised closing words of the quoted passage from Russell J’s judgment tend to show that he had no such notion in mind. The basis of the ordei against Alamed was simply that, in the circumstances that had been revealed, Gilford’s case showed that “an equitable remedy is rightly to be granted directly against the creature ... ”. Jones's case illustrates no more than that, in a case m which the contracting puppeteer has used his creature company in a bid to escape his contractual obligations, and the circumstances merit the piercing of the company’s veil, it may be appropriate also to grant an equitable remedy directly against the company. It does not, we consider, develop the law any further than Gilford had taken it.