and
in the academic literature is that oil price shocks are an essential part of
the explanation of stagflation. In contrast, in this paper we make the case
that the oil price increases were not nearly as essential a part of the
causal mechanism generating the stagflation of the 1970s as is often
thought. We discuss reasons for being skeptical of the importance of
commodity supply shocks in general, and the 1973-1974 and 1979-1980
oil price shocks in particular, as the primary explanation of the stagflation
of the 1970s. First, we show that there were dramatic and acrossthe-board
increases in the prices of industrial commodities in the early
1970s that preceded the OPEC oil price increases. These price increases
do not appear to be related to commodity-specific supply shocks, but are
consistent with an economic boom fueled by monetary expansion. Second,
there is reason to doubt that the observed high and persistent
inflation in the deflator in the early and late 1970s can be explained by
the 1973-1974 and 1979-1980 oil price shocks. The argument that oil
price shocks caused the Great Stagflation depends on the claim that oil
price shocks are inflationary. Using a simple model, we show that a onetime
oil price increase will increase gross output price measures such as
the CPI, but not necessarily the price of value added, as proxied by the
GDP deflator. Indeed, an oil price increase may lower the deflator. Further,
the data show that only two of the five major oil price shocks since
1970 have been followed by significant changes in the inflation rate of
the GDP deflator, though in all cases the CPI inflation rate changed
sharply relative to the deflator. Although we come to the same conc