1 - Dialectic is the science of arg

1 - Dialectic is the science of arguing well . As you Know , We use words
when we argue . Words you see, are either simple or complex .
Simples are those which signify one thing , as when we say " man,
horse, argues, runs " . You should not be surprised that "argues " ,
though it is composed of two things ( argue + s, trans ) , nevertheless
is numbered among the simples ; for this is clear from the definition .
We said that a word was simple when it signified one thing . Thus it (argues) is covered by the definition, but it is not covered when I say 'Loquor' (I speak) , for though this is one word, it does not have a simple meaning , since it also designates the person who speaks. Hence it is from the first subject to being either true or false, since it can be affirmed or denied . Thus, all the verbs of the first and second person , although pronounced as one word, nevertheless must be counted among the complex words, since they do not have a simple meaning, Thus, whoever says 'ambulo' (I walk) marks understood both the action of walking ( ambulation) and that he himself does it, and anyone who says 'ambulas' (you walk) likewise signifies both the action performed and the person performing it. But when a person says 'ambulat' (walking is going on), he signifies only the action of walking , whence third person verbs are always numbered among the simples and can never be affirmed or denied, except when they are verbs such that there is of necessity attached to them the signification of personby usage, as when we say 'pluit' (it rains) or 'ninguit' (it snows), even when we do not add what rains or snows, since it (the subject) is understood, they cannot be put under the simples.
II. Complex words (coniuncta) are those which signify several things when put together , e.g. when we say 'homo' (a/the/0 man walks) or 'homo festinans in montem ambulat' (a/the/0 man walks, hurring to the mountain),etc. There are some complex utterances which form sentences, like those which have been cited, and others which do not form sentences, but require something, like those we have just cited when you subtract the verb ' ambulat' (walks) which we put there. Although 'homo festinans in montem' forms a complex expression, the sentence is left dangling from it. Leaving aside, then those complex expressions which do not form sentences, we are left with those which do. There are two species of those: 1. either they are made into sentences subject to affirmation or denial, e.g. 'omnis homo ambulat' (all men walk/ any man walks) or 'omnis homo non ambulat' (no man walks), or 2. a sentence is formed which, though it presents a proposal to the mind, can neither be affirmed nor denied, as when we command, wish, curse, etc. E.g., if someone says 'perge ad villam' (go to the town) or 'utinam pergat ad villam' (I wish he could go to the town) or 'Dii illum perduint' (may the gods damn him),it cannot be argued that he is lying or believed that he is telling the truth. For he is affirming or denying nothing. Thus these sentences are not brought into question and do not require disputants.
III . Those which are subject to disputation are either simple or complex. Those are simple which are pronounced without any connection with another sentence, e.g. 'omnis homo ambulat' (every man walks). They are complex when judgment is made concerning their conjunction (Tr. when the truth or falsity of the connective is the question), e.g. 'si ambulant, movetur' (if he is walking,he is moving / if walking is going on, movement is going on). But when judgment is given concerning the conjunction of sentences, it must wait until we come to the culmination (of the syllogism; a Stoic commonplace, tr.). The 'summa' (conclusion) is that which is made up of concessions (result from…)what I am saying is this : Whoever says 'si ambulat, movetur' (if he is walking, he is moving) wants to prove something, so that when I concede that this is true, he needs only to say what walks and th conclusion will follow and now cannot be denied, that is, that he moves—or he simply has to say that it does not move, so that the conclusion again follows and cannot be denied (not be conceded), namely that he does not walk. And again in like manner if someone says 'this man walks', it is a simple sentence; if I concede this one and he adds another, 'whoever walks, moves', and I likewise grant this one, from the conjunction of sentences, though uttered singly and conceded singly, the conclusion follows, which is now of necessity conceded, namely 'therefore, this man moves'.
IV. Now that these have briefly been set up, let us consider the individual arts. There are two first ones. 1. simple, as it were the material (building blocks) of dialectic; 2. Those which are called conjuncts, where the finished product, as it were, appears. The section on the simplexes is called 'De Loquendo' (on the utterance). The section on the complexes is divided into three parts: 1. those collections of words being set aside which do not make a complete sentence, those which complete a sentence so that a question is not raised or disputation is not called 'De Eloqueendo' (on speaking). 2. when a sentence is completed so, that it is judged (evaluated) as a simple sentence, that section is called 'De proloquendo' (on the sentence, on the statement). 3. That section in which a sentence is made in such a way that we judge concerning the connective itself until we come to the conclusion is called 'De proloquiorum Summa' (on the conclusion; on the syllogism). Let us more closely examine the various parts.
V. A word is the sign of some thing which can be understood by the hearer when pronounced by the speaker. A thing is whatever is felt (sensed) or understood or 'latet' (is hidden, inapprehensible). A sign is something which presents itself to the senses and something other than itself to the mind. To speak is to give a sign in articulate voice. I call that articulate which is capable of being comprised in letters. Whether all these things have been denied correctly or whether they should be followed with other definitions, the section which deals with the discipline of defining will indicate. Now listen attentively to what is coming: Any word 'sonat' (sounds; is sounded). Therefore, when it is written it is not a word, but the sign of a word; when the reader sees tem, the letters impinge upon the mind, which breaks out in voice. For what else do written letters do but present themselves to the eye and beyond themselves voices to thee mind, and we said a little earlier that a sign was something which presented itself to the senses and something other than itself to the mind. What we read then are not words but signs of words. But also, since the letter itself is the smallest part of articulate voice, we misuse this word (letter),when we also call it letter when we see something written, though it is totally silent nor is it a part of 'vox' (voice), but appears as a sign of a part of the 'vox' (voice). Likewise, we also call something written a word, although it is a sign of a word, that is, appears as the sign of significant 'vox' (voce). Thus, as we had just begun to say, every word has sound. But sound ( quod sonat) has nothing to do with dialectic. It is a question of the sound of a word when we investigate or pay attention to how vowels are softened in their disposition or how they lose hiatus when they come together, likewise, how consonants cluster by interposition or are made harsh by clustering , and how many or what kind of syllables (a word) consists of, where the poetic rhythm and accent, a matter for the ears of the grammarian alone, are treated . But when there is dispute concerning these things, that is not beyond dialectic. For it is the science of disputing. But since words concern things, went e assert something themselves, it is with words that the dispute is carried on concerning them. Since we cannot speak of words unless we use words, and when we speak we necessarily speak concerning something, these words seem to the mind to be signs of things. For when the word goes out of the mouth, if it goes out concerning itself, that is, for example, it argues or asks something concerning itself, it is a thing undoubtedly to disputation and question, and then the thing itself is called 'word'. That of the word which is not sensed by the ears but by the mind and it held enclosed in the mind itself is called 'dicible' (the expressible, the sayable; Stoic lekto/n). When the word is uttered not for its own sake, but to signify something about something, it is called 'dictio' (an expression, a saying). That thing which is neither a word nor the conception of a word in the mind, whether it has a word with which it may be signified or not, is called by its proper name nothing other than 'thing'. We then have four distinct things: 'word, dicibile, dictio, thing'. What I have called 'word' is both a word and signifies 'word'. What I have called 'dicibile' is a word, but it doesn't signify 'word', but that which is understood in the word and contained in the mind. What I have called 'dictio' is a word, but it signifies something similar to both the other two, namely, the word itself and what happens in the mind through the word. When I say 'thing' it is a word which signifies that which is left over after those three which have just been mentioned. Let us see if we can illustrate this by examples: Let a boy be questioned by a school teacher in this manner: "What part of speech is 'arma' (arms)?" 'arma' is here said concerning itself (for its own sake), i.e. is a word concerning a word. The other parts, however, when he says 'what part of speech….' Are either felt in the mind or pronounced by the voice, not for their own sake, but for the sake of 'arma'. But since they felt in the mind, 'dicibilia' (sayables) came before voice; when they break out in voice concerning what I said

النتائج (العربية) 1:

1-جدلية هو علم محتجة بشكل جيد. كما كنت أعلم، نستخدم عبارة عندما نجادل. ترى، والكلمات أما بسيطة أو معقدة.المفردة هي تلك التي تدل على شيء واحد، عندما نقول "الرجل، الحصان، ويجادل، ويدير ". فلم يفاجأ من أن "تدفع"، على الرغم من أنه يتكون من شيئين (القول + s، عبر)، ومع ذلك يتم ترقيم بين البسطاء؛ هذا واضح من التعريف. We said that a word was simple when it signified one thing . Thus it (argues) is covered by the definition, but it is not covered when I say 'Loquor' (I speak) , for though this is one word, it does not have a simple meaning , since it also designates the person who speaks. Hence it is from the first subject to being either true or false, since it can be affirmed or denied . Thus, all the verbs of the first and second person , although pronounced as one word, nevertheless must be counted among the complex words, since they do not have a simple meaning, Thus, whoever says 'ambulo' (I walk) marks understood both the action of walking ( ambulation) and that he himself does it, and anyone who says 'ambulas' (you walk) likewise signifies both the action performed and the person performing it. But when a person says 'ambulat' (walking is going on), he signifies only the action of walking , whence third person verbs are always numbered among the simples and can never be affirmed or denied, except when they are verbs such that there is of necessity attached to them the signification of personby usage, as when we say 'pluit' (it rains) or 'ninguit' (it snows), even when we do not add what rains or snows, since it (the subject) is understood, they cannot be put under the simples. II. Complex words (coniuncta) are those which signify several things when put together , e.g. when we say 'homo' (a/the/0 man walks) or 'homo festinans in montem ambulat' (a/the/0 man walks, hurring to the mountain),etc. There are some complex utterances which form sentences, like those which have been cited, and others which do not form sentences, but require something, like those we have just cited when you subtract the verb ' ambulat' (walks) which we put there. Although 'homo festinans in montem' forms a complex expression, the sentence is left dangling from it. Leaving aside, then those complex expressions which do not form sentences, we are left with those which do. There are two species of those: 1. either they are made into sentences subject to affirmation or denial, e.g. 'omnis homo ambulat' (all men walk/ any man walks) or 'omnis homo non ambulat' (no man walks), or 2. a sentence is formed which, though it presents a proposal to the mind, can neither be affirmed nor denied, as when we command, wish, curse, etc. E.g., if someone says 'perge ad villam' (go to the town) or 'utinam pergat ad villam' (I wish he could go to the town) or 'Dii illum perduint' (may the gods damn him),it cannot be argued that he is lying or believed that he is telling the truth. For he is affirming or denying nothing. Thus these sentences are not brought into question and do not require disputants.III . Those which are subject to disputation are either simple or complex. Those are simple which are pronounced without any connection with another sentence, e.g. 'omnis homo ambulat' (every man walks). They are complex when judgment is made concerning their conjunction (Tr. when the truth or falsity of the connective is the question), e.g. 'si ambulant, movetur' (if he is walking,he is moving / if walking is going on, movement is going on). But when judgment is given concerning the conjunction of sentences, it must wait until we come to the culmination (of the syllogism; a Stoic commonplace, tr.). The 'summa' (conclusion) is that which is made up of concessions (result from…)what I am saying is this : Whoever says 'si ambulat, movetur' (if he is walking, he is moving) wants to prove something, so that when I concede that this is true, he needs only to say what walks and th conclusion will follow and now cannot be denied, that is, that he moves—or he simply has to say that it does not move, so that the conclusion again follows and cannot be denied (not be conceded), namely that he does not walk. And again in like manner if someone says 'this man walks', it is a simple sentence; if I concede this one and he adds another, 'whoever walks, moves', and I likewise grant this one, from the conjunction of sentences, though uttered singly and conceded singly, the conclusion follows, which is now of necessity conceded, namely 'therefore, this man moves'.IV. Now that these have briefly been set up, let us consider the individual arts. There are two first ones. 1. simple, as it were the material (building blocks) of dialectic; 2. Those which are called conjuncts, where the finished product, as it were, appears. The section on the simplexes is called 'De Loquendo' (on the utterance). The section on the complexes is divided into three parts: 1. those collections of words being set aside which do not make a complete sentence, those which complete a sentence so that a question is not raised or disputation is not called 'De Eloqueendo' (on speaking). 2. when a sentence is completed so, that it is judged (evaluated) as a simple sentence, that section is called 'De proloquendo' (on the sentence, on the statement). 3. That section in which a sentence is made in such a way that we judge concerning the connective itself until we come to the conclusion is called 'De proloquiorum Summa' (on the conclusion; on the syllogism). Let us more closely examine the various parts.V. A word is the sign of some thing which can be understood by the hearer when pronounced by the speaker. A thing is whatever is felt (sensed) or understood or 'latet' (is hidden, inapprehensible). A sign is something which presents itself to the senses and something other than itself to the mind. To speak is to give a sign in articulate voice. I call that articulate which is capable of being comprised in letters. Whether all these things have been denied correctly or whether they should be followed with other definitions, the section which deals with the discipline of defining will indicate. Now listen attentively to what is coming: Any word 'sonat' (sounds; is sounded). Therefore, when it is written it is not a word, but the sign of a word; when the reader sees tem, the letters impinge upon the mind, which breaks out in voice. For what else do written letters do but present themselves to the eye and beyond themselves voices to thee mind, and we said a little earlier that a sign was something which presented itself to the senses and something other than itself to the mind. What we read then are not words but signs of words. But also, since the letter itself is the smallest part of articulate voice, we misuse this word (letter),when we also call it letter when we see something written, though it is totally silent nor is it a part of 'vox' (voice), but appears as a sign of a part of the 'vox' (voice). Likewise, we also call something written a word, although it is a sign of a word, that is, appears as the sign of significant 'vox' (voce). Thus, as we had just begun to say, every word has sound. But sound ( quod sonat) has nothing to do with dialectic. It is a question of the sound of a word when we investigate or pay attention to how vowels are softened in their disposition or how they lose hiatus when they come together, likewise, how consonants cluster by interposition or are made harsh by clustering , and how many or what kind of syllables (a word) consists of, where the poetic rhythm and accent, a matter for the ears of the grammarian alone, are treated . But when there is dispute concerning these things, that is not beyond dialectic. For it is the science of disputing. But since words concern things, went e assert something themselves, it is with words that the dispute is carried on concerning them. Since we cannot speak of words unless we use words, and when we speak we necessarily speak concerning something, these words seem to the mind to be signs of things. For when the word goes out of the mouth, if it goes out concerning itself, that is, for example, it argues or asks something concerning itself, it is a thing undoubtedly to disputation and question, and then the thing itself is called 'word'. That of the word which is not sensed by the ears but by the mind and it held enclosed in the mind itself is called 'dicible' (the expressible, the sayable; Stoic lekto/n). When the word is uttered not for its own sake, but to signify something about something, it is called 'dictio' (an expression, a saying). That thing which is neither a word nor the conception of a word in the mind, whether it has a word with which it may be signified or not, is called by its proper name nothing other than 'thing'. We then have four distinct things: 'word, dicibile, dictio, thing'. What I have called 'word' is both a word and signifies 'word'. What I have called 'dicibile' is a word, but it doesn't signify 'word', but that which is understood in the word and contained in the mind. What I have called 'dictio' is a word, but it signifies something similar to both the other two, namely, the word itself and what happens in the mind through the word. When I say 'thing' it is a word which signifies that which is left over after those three which have just been mentioned. Let us see if we can illustrate this by examples: Let a boy be questioned by a school teacher in this manner: "What part of speech is 'arma' (arms)?" 'arma' is here said concerning itself (for its own sake), i.e. is a word concerning a word. The other parts, however, when he says 'what part of speech….' Are either felt in the mind or pronounced by the voice, not for their own sake, but for the sake of 'arma'. But since they felt in the mind, 'dicibilia' (sayables) came before voice; when they break out in voice concerning what I said

النتائج (العربية) 3:

1 - الجدل هو علم بحجة أيضا.كما تعلمون، نحن نستخدم الكلمات
عندما نجادل.الكلمات التي تراها، هي إما بسيطة أو معقدة
بسيطة هي تلك التي تدل على شيء واحد، كما هو الحال عندما نقول "يا رجل
الحصان يقول، يعمل".يجب أن لا يفاجأ أن "يقول"
رغم انه مكون من شيئين (يقولون S، ترانس)، ومع ذلك
ترقيم بين بسطاء؛هذا هو الواضح من التعريف.
وقلنا إن كانت كلمة بسيطة عندما تدل على شيء واحد.ومن ثم (يجادل) مشمول في تعريف، ولكنها لا تغطي loquor عندما أقول '(أتكلم) وإن كان هذا هو كلمة واحدة، فإنه لا يكون له معنى بسيط، لأنه أيضا بتعيين الشخص الذي يتحدث.ومن ثم فإن من أول الموضوع أن يتم إما صحيحة أو خاطئة،لأنه لا يمكن إثباته أو نفيه.وبالتالي، فإن جميع أفعال الشخص الأول والثاني، بالرغم من أن يلفظ بكلمة واحدة، ومع ذلك يجب أن تكون في عداد الكلمات المعقدة، منذ فهي ليس لها معنى بسيط، وبالتالي، من قال ambulo '(أمشي) علامات يفهم كل عمل يسير (تمشي وأن يقوم هو بنفسه،و أي شخص يقول ambulas' (تمشي) كذلك يعني كل عمل يقوم الشخص الذي يقوم به.ولكن عندما يقول شخص ambulat '(المشي يحدث)، انه يعني فقط عمل يسير، اين شخص ثالث من الأفعال دائما ترقيم بين بسطاء و لا يمكن إثباته أو نفيه،إلا عندما تكون مثل هذه الأفعال أن هناك ضرورة تعلق لهم المغزى من استخدام personby، حيث أننا عندما نقول أن pluit '(هطل المطر) أو' 'ninguit (ثلوج)، حتى عندما نحن لا نضيف أي أمطار أو ثلوج، لأنه (موضوع المفهوم، فإنه لا يمكن وضعها تحت بسيطة.
الثاني.الكلمات المعقدة (coniuncta) هي تلك التي تدل على عدة أشياء عند وضع معا، على سبيل المثال