Issues about the methods and types of data that philosophers shoulduse are entangled with views about the nature of philosophy. Such viewsbelong to what is called “metaphilosophy”: the philosophical study ofphilosophy itself. Conceptual analysis and naturalism are examples ofdifferent metaphilosophies. (In fact, “conceptual analysis” and “naturalism” are each umbrella terms that cover a number of metaphilosophical views). Metaphilosophical views are especially hard to argue for.Moreover, many philosophers do not argue for, or even make explicit,whatever metaphilosophical views they hold. Very often whatever metaphilosophical views they may have are background assumptions that areonly implicit in their work. This practice is understandable: these philosophers want to get on and tackle “first-order” philosophical problemsabout the nature of mind, or truth, or the physical world, and so on, notthe “second-order” problem of the nature of philosophy. Still, the natureof philosophy is a legitimate area of philosophical inquiry. And since ourviews about this area, and about the nature of philosophical problems,will bear on how we tackle first-order philosophical problems, it deservesto be investigated as well.Although philosophical methodology has connections with grandmetaphilosophical issues, this should not mislead us. Much philosophicalmethodology consists in making or evaluating arguments, distinctionsand qualifications. These practices are mostly not the special preserve ofsome particular metaphilosophical faction. For the most part, they forma common venture.This book’s concern with philosophical problems, the principles usedto try to resolve them, and the metaphilosophies underlying them reflectsa more general concern with disciplined theoretical work in philosophy.Some may worry about how far this neglects the history of philosophy.3The issue of the relation of philosophy to the history of philosophy is acontroversial one. Although in this book I do not draw upon the historyof philosophy, that is not because the book is committed to claiming thatthe history of philosophy has no important bearing on how philosophyshould be studied.4 The book’s scope is intentionally limited in scope inseveral ways. If the history of philosophy has an important bearing on