Political Islam in Saudi Arabia has to be analyzed in the context of Saudi Arabia's regional
policies. Given Saudi Arabia's crucial position as the country of the two holy places of Islam,
Mecca and Medina, as well as their newly proactive foreign policy, the question of what foreign
policy the country should have has become a source of debate amongst Saudi Islamists.
Because debates about domestic politics in Saudi Arabia are restricted, debates about foreign
policy become arenas where conflicts between opposing social forces are played out. Saudi
Arabia is one of the most important Arab and Islamic countries, strategically located and with
huge financial resources at its disposal. Therefore, these debates about foreign policy are of
tremendous importance for the Middle East and beyond. I argue that apart from geopolitics, the
dynamic relationship between the Saudi state and Saudi Islamists has been crucial in shaping
Saudi foreign policy since 2011.
Since 2011 Saudi Islamist actors had to adjust to a rapidly changing regional environment and
to power struggles in the Saudi ruling family that culminated in the coronation of King Salman
and the appointment of his new administration in 2015. By and large, Islamist actors were
appalled by the public Saudi backing of the coup in Egypt. The emergence of the Islamic State
(IS), on the other hand, was greeted with some sympathy, because IS could feed into antiIranian
and anti-Shiite sentiment, which had been stirred up by Saudi and GCC government
rhetoric and media for years. In addition, the quick advances of the group contributed to its
popularity in Saudi Arabia, as did the fact that thousands of Saudis and GCC nationals joined it
as fighters, commanders and ideologues. But the flow of Saudi fighters and financing to Syria
was publicly condemned and clamped down upon by the government, especially after the
declaration of the caliphate in mid-2014. King Salman, who ascended to the throne in January
2015, could build on his extensive contacts with various Islamist forces in the kingdom, which he
had forged as governor of Riyadh since 1963. Indeed, he and his new administration seemed to
be closer to Saudi Islamists, including to supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.1
As a result, and probably again because this fits into the Saudi nationalist narrative of the
kingdom as the defender of the "Sunnis" in the region, the war against the Houthis in Yemen
that started in March 2015 was endorsed by Saudi Islamist forces from across the ideological
spectrum. It was an opportunity for Islamist clerics and public figures to declare their support for
the new king and the Saudi leadership, as well as Saudi regional policies, without losing face in
front of their supporters.